в пострадянській Україні, Канада критично ставиться до темпів цього транзиту та якості трансформаційних процесів. При цьому представники діаспори є більш відвертими у своїй критиці щодо проблем в Україні. Із-поміж основних перепон на цьому шляху називають корупцію, гальмування реформ, інституційну слабкість, конфронтацію між прибічниками та противниками реформ та регіональними кланами. Із 2014 р. після анексії Криму також розглядається й зовнішній чинник. Канада потужно допомагає Україні в часі боротьби проти російської агресії, надаючи технічну, фінансову та дипломатичну допомогу.

Ключові слова: Канада, Україна, демократія, допомога.

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the nonproliferation aspects of US strategy that were not explained well in the published excerpts of the first two Nuclear Posture Reviews of presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush. As George Bush faced with the new challenges that required developing updated nonproliferation strategy like he terroristic acts on 11 September 2001, war in Iraq – the nonproliferation policy had to change too and focus more on preventing the terrorists from acquiring the nuclear bomb and nuclear materials. The last two NPRs of 2010 and 2018 were published fully and considered in the article as the primary source for understanding the nonproliferation policy of presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. All four post-Cold War presidential administrations faced with the new proliferation challenges, and the author examines how these new challenges were described in the US strategic documents and how the US nonproliferation strategy evolves. In addition, the article studies the practical implementation of the proclaimed nonproliferation strategies of four presidents and compares the efficiency of this implementation by each presidential administration. The author also assesses the consequences of realizing the US nonproliferation strategy for the international security and its influence of the future development of the global nonproliferation regime.

Key words: US nonproliferation strategy; Nuclear Posture Review; National Security Strategy; Non-Proliferation Treaty; spread of nuclear weapons.

1. INTRODUCTION

Formulation of the Problem. The end of the Cold War radically changed the international security environment. From the one hand, the risks of the global nuclear war decreased. But from the other hand, the risks of the proliferation of the nuclear weapons to the new countries increased. In addition, the rise of the terrorist threat led to concerns that nuclear weapons or related materials might be available to the non-state actors.

Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. As this article focuses on the strategic thinking of the US presidential administrations regarding the policy to reduce the risks of the nuclear proliferation, it was mainly used native documents and sources. The US strategy regarding the nonproliferation is mainly described in the strategic documents, which are called «Nuclear Postures Review Reports» (NPR). This type of the documents was not published during the Cold War due to the high tensions between the two nuclear superpowers and extreme secrecy of the nuclear planning. The first two nuclear postures, which were issued in 1994 [1] and 2002 [10], were also mostly classified, but some excerpts leaked to the press. The next Nuclear Posture Reviews in 2010 [15], during the Obama administration published the full
text of the NPR. The fourth NPR in the US post-Cold War history was issued in 2018 by the Trump administration, which also published the full and detailed text of the document [7].

Other strategic documents, related to the US security and defense, are the National Security Strategies, in 1996 [5] and in 2002 [11]. These documents pay less attention to the nonproliferation issues, and the article will discuss their provisions if it is necessary. This paper analyzes a pretty long period of time (the early 1990s–2020). Four US presidential administrations served during this time, and many things changed. In this article there are practical examples of the US policy toward disarmament in Ukraine in 1990-ies [2] and Iranian nuclear program [20; 21].

The Purpose of the Research. The nuclear postures describe different aspects of the US nuclear policy but this article will focus mainly on analysis of their nonproliferation chapters. As the paper also compares the strategic guidelines written in the documents with their practical implementation, it is essential to compare declared and real policy of the US administrations.

2. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

Nonproliferation is one of the top priorities of the US foreign and security policy, but effective implementing this policy often depends on a good strategy. However, the strategic documents did not always pay enough attention to the nonproliferation issues. This is also true for the first Nuclear Posture Review that was issued by the administration of president Bill Clinton in 1994. Nevertheless, the US nonproliferation strategy did not change too fast. It was always adapted to the new historical conditions, but it also took into the account the previous experience and measures undertaken by the predecessors. Thus, the US nonproliferation strategy had a rather harmonic evolution, although sometimes it was not perfect.

Presidents Bush and Trump appear to be much less successful in the nonproliferation field than presidents Obama and Clinton. Bush and Trump’s NPRs and other strategic documents raise concerns about the lowering threshold of the nuclear weapons use and do not encourage the non-nuclear weapons states to strictly follow their NPT obligations. Both Republican presidents ruined important nuclear deals that worked well and prevented development of the nuclear weapons programs (president George W. Bush destroyed the US-North Korean agreement, and Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran).

The implementation of Obama’s nonproliferation strategy appears to be rather effective because during his presidency, the Iranian nuclear program
was limited and put under international control, and Barak Obama’s initiative to conduct Nuclear Security Summits reduced the risks of the nuclear terrorism. However, president Obama failed to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.

It looks like the further increase of the number of the nuclear weapons states is very unlikely during the next decade. Both countries of main proliferation concern (Iran and North Korea) would unlikely try to deteriorate the world strategic stability. Iran seems to give up the nuclear weapons ambitions because of fear to get into the complete economic and political isolation. And North Korea would unlikely use its nuclear weapons because of fear of the end of the regime. Thus, the current proliferation risks appear to be manageable, and the administration of next president Joseph Biden would be able to reduce them.

1. Nonproliferation Strategy of Bill Clinton’s Presidential Administration

Perhaps, the classified part of the Clinton’s Nuclear Posture Review Report provides more detailed explanation of the US nonproliferation strategy. However, we can only rely on the published excerpt, [1] which describes the situation with nonproliferation rather briefly. The nonproliferation section is the last one in the document and it discusses more the implementing START – treaty by Russia rather than the nonproliferation problems. Only few words are mentioned about such a relevant proliferation threat like a risk of «loss or theft of fissile material or nondeployed nuclear warheads» in Russia. The document does not offer the strategy to solve this problem and just states «there is merit in exploring, together with the Russians and others, initiatives that would reduce this risk».

Meanwhile, the early 1990s were a difficult period for the nonproliferation regime, and the US strategic documents should have reacted on the risks of obtaining nuclear weapons by the new countries.

On the one hand, the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union were successful for the nonproliferation. South Africa voluntarily dismantled its nuclear arsenal and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine declared their intention to give up the Soviet nuclear warheads and missiles, which remained on their territory after the Cold War.

On the other hand, the difficulties and delays with the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine took place. During the short period of time, the Ukrainian government considered options to keep the nuclear weapons, and that created a very nervous atmosphere during the talks between Russia, Ukraine,
and the United States [2]. Ukraine’s desire to receive more benefits for the nuclear disarmament led to delays in the negotiations.

Meanwhile, it was crucially important to end these nuclear disarmament negotiations with Ukraine before the 1995 NPT Review Conference started. This conference was more important than the others because its participants had to take a decision regarding the NPT prolongation. According to the second paragraph of the Article 10 of the Nonproliferation Treaty, «twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods» [3].

Thus, there was a real risk that the NPT would not be extended. If Ukraine did not join the NPT before the 1995 conference, this risk would increase, and the absence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would significantly destabilize the international security.

The published excerpt of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review mentions Ukraine only once and states, «the removal of weapons located on the territory of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus is still incomplete». To respond on this challenge the document just suggests to «maintain nuclear weapons necessary to deter any possible threat or to respond to aggression, should deterrence fail» [1].

By the time of issuing the Clinton’s NPR in 1994, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were not among the primary proliferation concerns, and it appears that the document should not mention the nuclear deterrence option regarding these countries. The proliferation risks in these countries were mainly related with the need to prevent the thefts of the nuclear and other radioactive materials. However, the 1994 NPR does not mention this problem and only briefly describes the risks of potential loss of the fissile materials in Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia was not the only country that posed danger to the nonproliferation regime in 1990s. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea were suspected to develop the nuclear weapons during this time, [4, p. 5–6] but the published excerpt of the Clinton’s Nuclear Posture Review does not even mention these countries. Thus, the 1994 NPR stresses more attention on the deterrence rather than effective measures to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Such a strategy was typical for the Cold War period.

Another strategic document issued by the Bill Clinton’s administration was «A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement» [5]. This document, which was published in February 1996, pays more attention to the nonproliferation issues than the first US Nuclear Posture Review of 1994.
The 1996 National Security Strategy (NSS) assesses the positive achievements of the US nonproliferation policy and admits that «a key objective of our nonproliferation strategy was realized in May 1995 when a consensus of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extended the Treaty indefinitely and without conditions». The document described the NPT «as the bedrock of all global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons». In addition, the document praised NPT accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and their nuclear disarmament. The National Security Strategy also mentions the threats of spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the non-state actors and terrorists. According to the document, «strategy continues to ensure the safeguarding of more nuclear materials so they do not fall into the hands of terrorists or international criminals» [5].

It should be admitted that most of the aforementioned US strategic goals regarding nonproliferation were achieved later successfully. However, the United States failed to reach the comprehensive ban of the nuclear tests that was proclaimed as one of the strategic goals by the NSS. In 1996, the United States signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [6], but in 1999, the US Senate did not ratify the CTBT. The next US strategic documents mentioned the US intention to promote the CTBT’s entry into force because this treaty can strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and increase transparency of the states’ nuclear programs. However, the last Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 finally mentioned that the United States is not going to seek a CTBT’s ratification although it would keep the nuclear test moratorium [7].

The 1996 National Security Strategy also provides an explanation of the US strategy to eliminate the nuclear security risks in Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) states. Although the number of the nuclear weapons states was fixed after Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine joined the NPT as non-nuclear states, there was still a risk that other state or non-state actors would try to steal the nuclear materials in the FSU to produce the nuclear weapons.

The situation in Russia was particularly dangerous in 1990s, because this country possessed a huge amount of the fissile materials and nuclear scientists, but it lacked the costs to prevent the leakage of the sensitive materials and technologies [8, p. 272]. Both 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and 1996 National Security Strategy even mentioned the threat of loss or theft of the Russian nuclear warheads.

To prevent this dramatic threat the United States launched the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1992. [9, p.4] The 1996 National Security Strategy stressed on the importance of continuation of the CTR activities in the former Soviet Union countries.
A positive fact was that unlike the 1994 NPR, the 1996 National Security Strategy listed the wider range of the proliferation threats. The NSS did not focus on the proliferation risks in the FSU only, but also analyzed the risks of acquiring nuclear weapons by other countries. The 1996 NSS admits that «the proliferation problem is global, but we must tailor our approaches to specific regional contexts» [5]. According to the document, the US nonproliferation strategy in the Middle East region would include «efforts to prevent Iran from advancing its weapons of mass destruction objectives and to thwart Iraq from reconstituting its previous programs» [5].

Summing up, the Clinton administration had some delays with creating a nonproliferation strategy, which was pretty well elaborated in the National Security Strategy in 1996. Nevertheless, most US strategic goals in the nonproliferation field were achieved by president Bill Clinton because the NPT was successfully extended, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear terrorism threats were prevented in Russia thanks to the Nunn-Lugar program, Iraq did not try to reestablish its nuclear program etc.

2. Nonproliferation in the Strategic Documents of Bush Administration

The next presidential administration of George Bush faced with the new challenges that required developing updated nonproliferation strategy. The terrorist acts on 11 September 2001 had a tremendous impact on the US policy. The nonproliferation policy had to change too and focus more on preventing the terrorists from acquiring the nuclear bomb and nuclear materials.

In January 2002, the George Bush administration issued the Nuclear Posture Review. It was just a second official document of this type after Clinton’s administration prepared the NPR in 1994. Like Clinton’s Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush NPR was mostly classified.

The 2002 NPR listed the countries, which the United States considered to be potentially dangerous for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria were included by the Bush Nuclear Posture Review to the list of the countries of particular concern. The document described these five countries as «the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies» [10]. The US officials feared that these five countries could obtain nuclear weapons and give it to the terrorists. Thus, the officials from Bush administration had more information about the secret nuclear activities of Syria and Libya than their predecessors from the Clinton’s administration who did not mention these two countries in the proliferation context in the US strategic documents. However, unlike the Clinton’s administration, the Bush presidential office exaggerated the scope of the nuclear activities of
Saddam Hussein’s regime after Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf war of 1991.

Like previous 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2002 NPR also pays more attention to deterrence rather than nonproliferation. Both NPRs are mostly classified, so it is difficult to assess the US nonproliferation policy on their base. However, another US strategic document, the National Security Strategy, which was published by Bush administration in 2002, provides more clarifications about US strategic goals in the nonproliferation area. In particular, the 2002 NSS gives more details regarding the US strategy toward the countries of proliferation concern.

The 2002 NSS added some new elements to the US nonproliferation strategy, i.e. preemption and prevention. According to the document, «given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past» [11]. The goal of preemption and prevention was «not let our enemies to strike first», as the 2002 National Security Strategy stated [11]. Attacking Iraq in 2003 to stop its alleged nuclear program before Saddam Hussein’s regime produced a nuclear bomb was an example of this US preemptive approach toward nonproliferation that did not exclude military option.

The preemptive approach toward the nuclear proliferation appeared to work successfully in case of Libya. When the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi observed the crushing end of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, he expressed his interest to stop Libya’s nuclear program and improve relations with the United States, most likely to avoid Iraq’s fate. Muammar Qaddafi voluntarily dismantled Libyan nuclear facilities. It is often supposed that Qaddafi was afraid that the United States would also attack his country like they did with Iraq if he did not reject the WMD activities, although the Libyans themselves tried to avoid this impression [12].

Three countries of proliferation concern (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) were considered by the Bush administration as particularly dangerous for the US security and were included to the so called «axis of evil» [13]. It appears that the Bush strategy toward the «axis of evil» states failed because due to the efforts of this administration, all three countries became more dangerous for the international security and the United States than they were at the beginning of the 21st century.

3. Nonproliferation Strategy of 2010 NPR

During the presidency of Barack Obama, the US nonproliferation policy did not change significantly. The Obama Nuclear Posture Review was published in 2010. Although the 2010 NPR declared the revolutionary goal of the US policy to abolish nuclear weapons, the clarifications of the president
Barak Obama and his administration explained that declaring that goal did not mean the radical change of the US nuclear policy because the goal of complete elimination of the nuclear weapons was supposed to be achieved in the far future. The president Obama stressed that the nuclear weapons would not be abolished during his lifetime [14].

Therefore, like the previous nuclear postures, the 2010 NPR focused on the pragmatic analysis of the strategy to prevent the proliferation of the nuclear weapons from existing nuclear weapons states (NWS) to other countries or to the non-state actors.

The 2010 NPR proclaimed the slight reducing of the role of nuclear weapons in the US defense policy and encouraged the non-nuclear states to fulfill the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comply with all the nonproliferation norms. For example, Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review Report declared that «the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations» [15].

Such a declaration was absent in the previous Nuclear Posture Reviews which did not exclude the potential possibility of using the US nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state in case of need and mentioned «all options on the table» [16] that might be used to defend the United States, its allies, and partners.

Thus, Barack Obama moved in the direction of strengthening US «long-standing ‘negative security assurance’» as the 2010 NPR proclaimed [17]. Although, the document’s authors admitted that the United States was «not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons», they stressed, however, that the United States «will work to establish conditions under which such a policy [of negative security assurance] could be safely adopted» [17].

However, the 2010 NPR did not specify who and how would determine whether the non-nuclear weapons states followed their nonproliferation obligations or not [18]. According to the international law, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for determining whether the non-nuclear weapons states follow their NPT obligations or not, and the appropriate conclusions are published in the IAEA reports. In their interviews, the US officials clarified that the IAEA Board of Governors’ reports would influence their position but the final judgment about the countries’ compliance with the NPT norms would be made by the United States only [15].
Such a clarification definitely would not satisfy countries like Iran, which do not expect that the United States has a positive judgment about them. The absence of clarity regarding the criteria of the state that follows the NPT obligations does not create a positive effect on nonproliferation.

During the Obama’s presidency only two countries of the world (North Korea and Iran) raised proliferation concerns. The 2010 NPR describes a similar strategy regarding both countries. «Reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran» is proclaimed by the 2010 NPR as a US strategic goal. This goal was supposed to be achieved by engaging «multilaterally and bilaterally with these states to arrive at negotiated solutions that provide for their political and economic integration with the international community, while verifiably confirming they are not pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities». Thus, president Obama completely gave up the preemptive approach of his predecessor and focused on the negotiation strategy to stop proliferation. In case that strategy did not work regarding North Korea and Iran, the US goal would be to create conditions of «their further isolation and increasing international pressure» [15, p. 31].

4. Nonproliferation and 2018 NPR

The presidential administration of Donald Trump published its Nuclear Posture Review in 2018. This document followed some guidelines prescribed in the previous strategic document and demonstrated the continuity of the US nuclear policy [7, p. 21]. However, it also added some new elements to the US nuclear strategy in general and nonproliferation approach in particular.

The last Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2018 reconfirmed the US promise not to use the nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states that comply with their NPT obligations [7, p. 21]. However, the president Trump’s policy toward Iran has most likely increased the general distrust to this promise. Since 2013, Iran had been following the nonproliferation norms, put his nuclear program under the strict international control, and in 2015 signed and fulfilled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – a document, which further limited its nuclear program [20]. The IAEA issued numerous reports, which confirmed that Iran did not break the Nonproliferation Treaty and JCPOA [21]. It looked like Iran did everything to be considered by the United States as a country that complied with its obligations under the NPT.

After reading Trump’s NPR, some experts have impression that the United States might threaten to use the nuclear weapons in response to cyber
attacks [22]. Cyber attacks or other «significant non-nuclear attacks» could be theoretically performed by the non-nuclear states too, so the Trump’s nuclear doctrine does not exclude the nuclear weapons use against these countries. Thus, despite repeating the declaration from the Obama’s nuclear posture about non-use of the US nuclear weapons against countries that fulfill their NPT obligations, in fact, the Trump’s NPR moved away from giving negative assurances and no-first-use of the nuclear weapons. That could lower the threshold of using the nuclear weapons and decrease the world strategic stability [23].

In general, the 2018 NPR is much more focused on the nuclear deterrence and assessing the military role of the nuclear weapons than on describing the nonproliferation strategy. Nevertheless, the last section of the NPR’s summary provides clear explanations of the Trump administration’s approach toward the nonproliferation. According to the document, the effective nuclear nonproliferation that corresponds to the security interests of the United States, its allies and partners can be supported by the following measures: «controlling the spread of nuclear materials and technology; placing limits on the production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons». The document lists the following nonproliferation priorities for the United States: «1) minimize the number of nuclear weapons states, including by maintaining credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and assurance; 2) deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; 3) strictly control weapons-usable material, related technology, and expertise» [7, p. 16]. These priorities were also present in the previous US strategic documents.

Iran and North Korea were considered by the Trump’s presidential administration as countries of the primary nonproliferation concerns. Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review Report describes detailed tailored strategies for each of these two countries.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The evolution of the US Nonproliferation strategy is reflected by four Nuclear Postures Reviews Reports that were published after the end of Cold War. Since the presidency of Bill Clinton, each coming president issued the new NPR shortly after coming to the White House.

The first two Nuclear Postures of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were mostly classified and do not provide a clear vision of the US
strategy regarding nonproliferation. However, this lack of vision is compensated by the Clinton’s National Security Strategy of 1996 and Bush NSS of 2002. These two documents give better explanations of the US nonproliferation policy during the presidency of Bill Clinton and George Bush than the first two NPRs.

The Nuclear Posture Review Reports of presidents Obama and Trump were published in full and clarify well the US strategic guidelines in the nonproliferation field, so there is no need to look for additional explanations in the National Security Strategies.

Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review Report pays more attention to the nonproliferation issues than other NPRs. It appears that president Obama had a better nonproliferation strategy than other post-Cold War presidents who served until current time. In addition, Obama’s NPR included measures that could promote and strengthen nuclear nonproliferation regime like reducing the role of the nuclear weapons in US military planning and promising not to use US nuclear weapons against countries that comply with their NPT obligations. However, the last promise was not convincing because the 2010 NPR did not set a clear criteria of a state that does not break the nonproliferation norms.

President Bill Clinton did not have a good nonproliferation strategy at the beginning of his term. This could be explained by the recent end of the Cold War because before the collapse of the Soviet Union the two superpowers paid much more attention to the nuclear deterrence and did not face the specific proliferation risks which emerged in the 1990s. Clinton’s strategy to react these new risks was elaborated in 1996 only, when the national Security Strategy was issued.

Nevertheless, despite some delays with working on a good nonproliferation strategy, its practical implementation was very well during the Clinton’s presidency because the NPT was successfully extended for an indefinite period of time, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine completed nuclear disarmament and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, North Korea reached agreement with the United States and froze its military nuclear program.

Presidents Bush and Trump appear to be much less successful in the nonproliferation field than presidents Obama and Clinton. Bush and Trump’s NPRs and other strategic documents raise concerns about the lowering threshold of the nuclear weapons use and do not encourage the non-nuclear weapons states to strictly follow their NPT obligations. Both Republican presidents ruined important nuclear deals that worked well and prevented
development of the nuclear weapons programs (president George W. Bush destroyed the US-North Korean agreement, and Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran).

However, despite some successes and failures of the four post-Cold War presidents of the United States, the situation with the nonproliferation in the world appears to be rather stable, and proliferation threats for the US security could be managed.

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ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ АМЕРИКАНСЬКОЇ СТР АТЕГІЇ
НЕРОЗПОВСЮДЖЕННЯ ПІСЛЯ ХОЛОДНОЇ ВІЙНИ

У статті проаналізовано стратегію США в галузі нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї протягом трьох десятиліть (із 1990-х по 2018 р.) та під час правління чотирьох президентів США (Білла Клінтона, Джорджа Буша, Барака Обами й Дональда Трампа). Розглянуто ключові напрями стратегії США щодо нерозповсюдження, які описано в чотирьох оглядах ядерної політики (Nuclear Posture Reviews), котрі опубліковано кожною адміністрацією президента після холодної війни. Ці документи описують ядерну політику США в цілому, але ми зосередимося на аналізі тих розділів, які стосувалися вирішення ризиків розповсюдження ядерної зброї. Також проаналізовано Стратегії національної безпеки 1996 та 2002 pp. для з’ясування напрямів стратегії США щодо ядерного нерозповсюдження, які не були добре пояснені в опублікованих фрагментах перших двох оглядів ядерної політики президентів Білла Клінтона та Джорджа Буша. Ураховуючи те, що Джордж Буш стикався з новими викликами, які вимагали розробки оновленої стратегії нерозповсюдження, як-от: терористичні акти 11 вересня 2001 р., війна в Іраку – політика нерозповсюдження також повинна була змінитися й більше зосередитися на запобіганні терористам, придбанню ядерної бомби та ядерних матеріалів. Останні два огляди ядерної політики США у 2010 і 2018 pp. опубліковані повністю та розглядаються в статті як першоджерело для розуміння політики нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї президентів Барака Обами й Дональда Трампа. Усі чотири адміністрації президента після холодної війни зіткнулися з новими проблемами розповсюдження. Ми досліджуємо, як ці нові проблеми розглянуто в стратегічних документах США та як еволюціонує стратегія нерозповсюдження. Крім того, у статті вивчається практична реалізація проголошених стратегій нерозповсюдження чотирьох президентів та порівнюється ефективність цієї реалізації кожною адміністрацією президента. Також оцінено наслідки реалізації американської стратегії нерозповсюдження для міжнародної безпеки та її вплив на майбутній розвиток глобального режиму нерозповсюдження.

Ключові слова: стратегія нерозповсюдження США; огляд поставок ядер; Стратегія національної безпеки; Договір про нерозповсюдження зброї; поширення ядерної зброї.

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